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1. Introduction: Liberalism and Democracy 
In a much discussed article Francis Fukuyama (1989)
1 diagnosed the collapse of the 
communist empire, in a Hegelian spirit, as the “end of history,” marked by humankind’s final 
arrival at the definitive institutional solutions to the problems of how to organize its economic 
and political affairs: market economy and liberal democracy. We know now that the author’s 
prediction of the history that was to unfold post 1989 was overly optimistic, in particular in 
not anticipating the destructive force of Islamic fundamentalism, the intricacy of the transition 
process in formerly communist countries, and the persistence of oppressive regimes in various 
parts of the world. Fukuyama’s “end of history” account may, nonetheless, contain an 
important element of truth insofar as it does not appear entirely unreasonable to suppose that 
the basic institutions of markets and of democracy represent the most workable forms of 
economic and political organization that humans have discovered in the evolutionary process 
of institutional experimentation that they have been engaged in throughout history. This, I 
submit, can be reasonably supposed even if there is still significant uncertainty about which 
specific institutional frameworks make markets work best in the service of human wellbeing 
and which specific institutions of democratic politics provide the best solution to the problems 
that are inevitably inherent in collective political choice. And it can also be maintained in 
spite of the hostilities and resistance that, in many parts of the world, the institutions of 
markets and democracy are still facing by those who see them as threats to cherished beliefs 
or to their own established privileges. 
  Even if the current financial crisis has refueled traditional anti-capitalist sentiments 
and anti-liberal rhetoric, the global trend that Fukuyama’s account was meant to capture is an 
encouraging sign for the future of liberalism, at least as far as the market-part of his account is 
concerned. Functioning markets with their protective institutions are to be found today in 
more places throughout the world than in past centuries. How far the spreading of democracy 
                                                 
1 The article was later expanded into a best selling book (Fukuyama 1992).   2
promises to advance the case of liberalism may seem a much more uncertain question, 
though, in light of the fact that the growth of the modern welfare state with its many 
restrictions on individual liberty has been a typical concomitant of the rise of democratic rule. 
Indeed, this fact has led some advocates of classical liberalism to suspect ‘”that there is an 
inherent tension between liberty and democracy.”
2  
  F.A. Hayek, arguably the most forceful defender of classical liberalism in the past 
century, has voiced a different opinion. He has pointed out that we need to distinguish 
between different concepts of democracy, in particular between – as he calls it – the "basic 
ideal of democracy" (Hayek 1979: 1) and the specific institutional forms in which this ideal 
has been implemented in the past. Specifically Hayek (1973:1) has contrasted "a conception 
of democracy according to which this is a form of government where the will of the majority 
on any particular issue is unlimited" with a constitutional conception of democracy that, while 
recognizing the principle of the "sovereignty of the people," insists on the role of a "limiting 
constitution," i.e. the requirement "that all authority is restrained by long-run principles which 
the opinion of the people approves" (Hayek 1979:102). Hayek's assertion is, in brief, that 
while an inherent conflict does indeed exist between liberalism and unlimited democracy, 
liberalism can be reconciled, and must be reconciled, with the ideal of a constitutionally 
limited democracy. Hayek’s two major treatises, The Constitution of Liberty (1960) and Law 
Legislation and Liberty (1973; 1976; 1979) can be viewed as contributions to the project of 
outlining a liberal constitutionalism that reconciles the ideal of liberalism with the 
fundamental ideal of democracy. 
  I concur with Hayek's view on the need to reconcile the ideals of liberalism and 
democracy (Vanberg 2008). Indeed, I suppose that the future of liberalism will depend on its 
ability to present itself as an outlook at politics that is compatible with the fundamental ideal 
of democracy. This claim is based on the conviction that, even if its specific institutional 
realizations may vary considerably, and continue to evolve, democracy in the generic sense, 
i.e. as a system of self-government, is the most sustainable form of government. It is based on 
the conviction that there is no intellectually defendable alternative to the basic democratic 
principle that the members-citizens of a polity are the ones on whose behalf political authority 
is exercised and to whom the exercise of such authority must be held responsible. And, most 
importantly for the purposes of this paper, it is based on the conviction that no other concept 
of legitimacy in politics can be compatible with the normative principle on which liberalism 
ultimately rests: the principle of individual sovereignty. 
                                                 
2 This is how R.G. Holcombe (2006: 310) describes the message of his book From Liberty to Democracy 
(Holcombe 2002).   3
  The purpose of this paper is to lay out arguments in support of the above claim by 
distinguishing between two liberal perspectives on constitutional rules, two perspectives that, 
as I shall seek to show, complement each other and can only in combination constitute a 
coherent and internally consistent liberalism. This is, on the one hand, a liberal 
constitutionalism that focuses on the need "to provide institutional safeguards of individual 
freedom” (Hayek 1973:1). And this is, on the other hand, a constitutional liberalism that 
focuses on the need to respect the principle of individual sovereignty at the level of 
constitutional choice. My principal argument is that by extending its ideal of individual 
autonomy to the level of constitutional choice liberalism can be reconciled with the “basic 
ideal of democracy.” 
 
2. Private Autonomy and Liberal Constitutionalism 
“A constitution that achieves the greatest possible freedom by framing the laws in such a way 
that the freedom of each can coexist with the freedom of all.” This quotation from Immanuel 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason appears as epigraph in the third volume of Hayek’s Law, 
Legislation and Liberty (1979: v), a treatise that, as its subtitle says, is meant as “A new 
statement of the liberal principles of justice and political economy.” A society that is based on 
the liberal principles that Hayek seeks to restate is a society of sovereign individuals who live 
peacefully together in mutual respect of each other’s rights. These rights are defined by 
socially sanctioned general rules, rules that protect an “assured private sphere” (Hayek 1960: 
13) within which individuals are free to choose as long as they do not interfere with the rights 
of others. The liberty individuals enjoy in the liberal society is “freedom under the law” (ibid.: 
153), liberty “limited only by the same abstract rules that apply equally to all” (ibid.: 155).
3  
  Liberty as assured private sphere under the law is captured by the concept of private 
autonomy. Private autonomy means autonomy of the individual within the limits of the rules 
of law. It is the liberty individuals enjoy as private law subject within an effectively enforced 
private law system “protecting a recognizable private domain” (Hayek1967a: 162). And a free 
society in which individuals enjoy such private autonomy can properly be called private law 
society.
4 As autonomous private law subjects, individuals are free to enter in voluntary 
                                                 
3 Hayek (1960: 19): “Liberty is … a condition in which all is permitted that is not prohibited by general rules.” - 
Hayek (1979: 111): “Individual liberty … requires that coercion be used only to enforce the universal rules of 
just conduct protecting the individual domains and that the individual can be restrained only in such conduct as 
may encroach upon the protected domains of others.” 
4 Franz Böhm, co-founder of the Freiburg School of Law and Economics (Vanberg 1998), speaks of the liberal 
society as “a private law society consisting of equally free people with equal rights” (Böhm 1989: 54; 1980: 
140). Commenting on Böhm’s contribution Hayek (1967a: 169) has noted that Böhm “described the liberal order   4
contractual relations with other equally free persons. Coordinating their social affairs by 
voluntary contracts they are able to realize the mutual benefits that can be had from voluntary 
cooperation. As M. Rothbard (1970: 77) puts it, the liberal private law society is a 
“contractual society”, a society organized in terms of “freely entered contractual relations 
between individuals” (Rothbard 1970: 77).  
  The paradigm case of mutually beneficial cooperation between autonomous private 
law subjects is bilateral market exchange, an exchange that is based on voluntary agreement 
of the transacting parties,
5 with the attribute ‘voluntary’ implying that the agreement is free 
from coercion and fraud.
6 By voluntarily agreeing to the transaction both parties indicate that 
they expect to benefit from it.
7 In an uncertain world their expectations, to be sure, need not 
necessarily come true. Yet, even if, ex post, in light of new information, parties to an 
exchange may regret their choice to enter into the exchange – just as, ex post, they may regret 
other choices they voluntarily made – the transaction must still be regarded as legitimate as 
long as the original agreement was given in the absence of coercion and fraud. To allow 
individuals to choose free from coercion and fraud is the function of the rules of the private 
law system, rules that draw the demarcation line between strategies that are permissible in 
interpersonal dealings and strategies that are prohibited as illegitimate ‘coercion’ and ‘fraud.’ 
In a world where all human interaction is about seeking to induce others to do things that the 
inducing party desires – in fact, behind every exchange offer is the intention to induce others 
to do something in return – rules that draw such a demarcation line are, quite obviously, 
essential for a functioning social order. 
  What we call a market is nothing other than a system of voluntary exchange. M. 
Friedman (1962: 13) speaks of “voluntary co-operation of individuals” as the “technique of 
the market place.” In order to function as an arena of voluntary exchange
 the market requires 
an institutional framework, namely the private law system, that defines property rights and 
specifies what qualifies or does not qualify as a ‘voluntary’ agreement. As J.M. Buchanan 
(1979: 31) puts it, the ‘market’ is “the institutional embodiment of the voluntary exchange 
processes that are entered into by individuals in their several capacities.” In similar terms 
Franz Böhm (1989: 54; 1980: 124) notes that “the functioning of the free market presupposes 
                                                                                                                                                         
very justly as the private law society.” – For a more detailed discussion of Böhm’s concept of the 
Privatrechtsgesellschaft or private law society see Vanberg 2007b. 
5 Rothbard (1970: 72): “The major form of voluntary interaction is voluntary interpersonal exchange.” 
6 As Rothbard (1970: 71) notes, the free society is „a society based on voluntary action, entirely unhampered by 
violence or threat of violence.”  
7 Friedman (1962: 13): “The possibility of co-ordination through voluntary co-operation rests on the elementary 
… proposition that both parties to an economic transaction benefit from it, provided the transaction is bi-laterally 
voluntary and informed.”      5
the existence of the private law society.”
8 In fact, as Böhm has argued, the private law society 
and the market economy are twin sisters in the sense that markets are nothing but the 
networks of economic relations that result from the freedom of choice that individuals enjoy 
in a private law society.
9 
  While bilateral market exchange is the paradigmatic instance of mutually beneficial 
cooperation it does by no means exhaust the possibilities that exist for private law subjects to 
realize mutual gains from voluntary cooperation. Cooperation for mutual benefit includes all 
contractual arrangements that autonomous individuals voluntarily enter into, such as, for 
instance, private associations, clubs, business enterprises, religious communities, and other 
kinds of corporate arrangements. It includes arrangements of multilateral exchange that 
individuals conclude in order to produce collective or club-goods, such as, for instance, a 
neighborhood swimming pool, arrangements in which everyone commits to contributing his 
share under the condition that all other participants contribute their share as well. It includes 
arrangements of team-production, such as the forming of a business enterprise. And it 
includes, in particular, arrangements whereby groups of individuals seek to realize mutual 
gains by jointly committing to rules that impose specific constraints on their future freedom of 
choice, such as the homeowners in a neighborhood agreeing on certain rules for how to 
maintain their property.
10 
  The important difference between ordinary bilateral or multilateral exchanges and 
joint commitment to rules is that the former are about one-time transactions while the latter 
are about limiting one’s freedom of choice for a future – limited or open-ended – period. By 
contrast to pure exchange contracts the latter are social or constitutional contracts in the sense 
that they are about a group of persons jointly imposing certain rule-constraints on their future 
choices. The “freedom to impose restrictions on one’s future behavior” (Goldberg 1976: 428) 
is part of the freedom of contract in the private law society. As long as such contracts are 
concluded voluntarily between autonomous private law subjects they must be considered 
legitimate even if they imply severe restrictions on the participants’ freedom of choice.
11 As I. 
Kirzner (1994: 105f.) puts it: “Where cooperation is of a real or imagined mutual benefit to a 
                                                 
8 Böhm (1989: 53; 1980: 121): “The exchange agreement and its fulfillment is the characteristic mode of 
cooperation between independent traders with equal rights. In this respect, therefore, the private law system is 
very decisively involved in controlling the free market process.”   
9 The title of Böhm’s (1980) major contribution on the subject is “Privatrechtsgesellschaft und Marktwirtschaft” 
( Private Law Society and Market Economy). 
10 As Buchanan (1979: 32) notes, such arrangements can be looked at as „cooperative trading arrangements 
which become merely extensions of the market as more restrictively defined.” 
11 What should be added here is the qualifying condition “as long as the contracting parties maintain their status 
as autonomous private law subjects.” This proviso excludes slavery contracts as legitimate contracts, even if the 
enslaved party were to agree voluntarily to the contract.   6
group of individuals, the market will of course provide scope for such cooperation. The 
market does, as has often been recognized, make it possible for groups within it to organize 
themselves in communes or other organizations on strictly socialist principles, if they choose 
(This, let us not forget, is how capitalist firms come into existence.).” Again, what legitimizes 
such organizational arrangements is the voluntary agreement among the participating 
individuals, whereby what counts as ‘voluntary’ is to be judged in terms of the rules on which 
the private law society, within which they are concluded, is based. 
  If the rules upon which the private law society is based were self-evident and self-
enforcing the ideal liberal society might be imagined as an ‘ordered anarchy,’ a social order 
that functions without a coercive apparatus of enforcement, based only on contractual 
arrangements among private law subjects. While such vision of a self-sustaining private law 
society may be an attractive conceptual benchmark, a realistic outlook at human nature and at 
a world where incentives to cheat on the rules of the game are omnipresent requires one to 
acknowledge the need for an “authority that has the necessary power” (Hayek 1960: 139) to 
enforce the rules, i.e. the need for a “social apparatus of compulsion and coercion that induces 
people to abide by the rules of life in society, the state” (Mises 1985: 35).
12 
  A liberalism that recognizes the need for government to enforce the rules on which the 
private law society is based is inseparable from constitutionalism. It recognizes that individual 
liberty as private autonomy needs constitutional protection in a double sense. It needs to be 
protected by the private law system as the ‘constitution’ of the private law society. And it 
needs to be protected by a ‘constitution’ in the standard sense, i.e. by a system of rules that 
limits the power of the agency that is supposed to enforce the private law system, the state.
13 
  Hayek (1973: 1) speaks of a “liberal constitutionalism” the chief aim of which is “to 
provide institutional safeguards of individual freedom” and “to secure individual liberty by 
constitutions.”
14 A constitution in the standard sense is, as he notes, “essentially a 
superstructure erected over a pre-existing system of law to organize the enforcement of that 
law” (ibid.: 134). The “pre-existing system of law” of which Hayek speaks comprises the 
universal rules of conduct, codified in the system of private law, that allow the private law 
                                                 
12 Friedman (1962: 25): “However attractive anarchy may be as a philosophy, it is not feasible in a world of 
imperfect men.” – Mises (1985: 39): “It is a grave misunderstanding to associate (liberalism, V.V.) in any way 
with the idea of anarchism. For the liberal, the state is an absolute necessity.” 
13 Hayek (1960: 182): “A free society certainly needs permanent means of restricting the powers of 
government.” 
14 About his treatise Law, Legislation and Liberty Hayek (1979: 41) says that it “mainly concerned with the 
limits that a free society must place upon the coercive powers of government.”   7
society to function, and the “superstructure” is the system of “rules of the allocation and 
limitation of government comprised in the law of the constitution” (ibid.).
15 
 
3. Constitutional Liberalism and Individual Sovereignty 
Liberal constitutionalism is concerned with individual liberty as private autonomy. It is about 
“the recognized rules of just conduct designed to define and protect the individual domain of 
each” (Hayek 1979:109) and about the constitutional provisions that are needed to limit the 
use of the coercive powers that are entrusted to the state in order to enforce these rules.
16 
Liberty as private autonomy means freedom of choice within the protected individual domain, 
within the assured private sphere. Its substantive content depends on how the socially 
enforced universal rules of conduct, or the rules of private law, are defined. These rules can 
and do differ, however, among different societies, and they have changed and continue to 
change over time. Accordingly, what liberty as private autonomy means in substance varies in 
content across societies and through time. This raises the question of how different systems of 
rules – systems of rules that, by implication, define ‘individual liberty’ differently – can be 
compared. 
  Since individual liberty as private autonomy can only be specified in terms of an 
existing private law system that defines its content, it can, quite obviously, not serve as the 
standard against which alternative private law systems themselves can be judged. As a 
criterion the content of which depends on what the existing system of rules defines as assured 
private domain it can only serve as an internal standard, applicable within a rule system, but 
not as one that could be applied across such systems. Yet, the ideal of individual liberty is not 
meant – and has surely not been meant by the founders of classical liberalism – as a normative 
criterion that can be applied only within a given rule system, but, instead, as an ideal that can 
also serve as a standard against which systems of rules themselves can be judged. Interpreted 
in this sense, i.e. as a standard for judging alternative systems of rules, the term ‘liberty’ can, 
quite obviously, not have the same meaning as ‘private autonomy.’ The ideal of ‘liberty’ as 
freedom of choice within given rules cannot be the same as an ideal of ‘liberty’ that is meant 
as a standard for judging the very rules that define the substance of private autonomy. 
  Understood as a normative criterion for judging alternative systems of rules, the ideal 
of liberty can essentially be interpreted in two alternative ways. Either in terms of a 
                                                 
15 Hayek (1973: 131f.) “The distinction between universal rules of just conduct and the rules of the organization 
of government is closely related to, and sometimes explicitly equated with, the distinction between private and 
public law.” 
16 Hayek (1978a: 109): “The limitation of all coercion to the enforcement of general rules of just conduct was the 
fundamental principle of classical liberalism, or, I would almost say, its definition of liberty.”   8
substantive criterion, i.e. as a criterion that allows one directly to judge alternative rules in 
terms of their nature or content. Or as a procedural criterion, i.e. as a criterion that judges 
rules indirectly in terms of the procedure by which they come about or from which they 
derive their legitimacy. The claim to provide a substantive criterion is, for instance, made by 
authors who take recourse to the concept of ‘natural rights’ as the standard against which 
existing rule systems should be judged. Such constructs provide, however, only a seeming 
solution to the problem that is at stake. They are of little help where there is disagreement on 
what should be regarded as ‘natural rights’ and where no unquestioned authority is recognized 
that can decide what these rights are. In a society of free and equal individuals with differing 
opinions on what ‘natural rights’ are, its members must somehow come to terms with each 
other in defining the rules according to which they want to live together. Comparable 
problems arise if the concept of ‘natural rights’ is meant to denote evolved rules that antecede 
deliberate codification and legislation. That all existing rule systems have been anteceded by 
evolved rules of conduct, and that in this sense “government never starts from a lawless state” 
(Hayek 1979: 123), is undoubtedly true.
17 Yet, in a world where evolution has produced 
different kinds of rules, evolved rules can decide what is ‘right’ only in their respective 
context of origin, but cannot serve as a standard to be applied across societies with different 
traditions. Furthermore, even in the environment in which they evolved they can serve as 
normative standard only so long as they are unquestionably respected within the respective 
group. In a society where they have lost their status as unquestioned and unquestionable 
standard free and equal individuals cannot escape the need to settle among themselves which 
rules they are jointly to submit to.
18 
 Interpreted  as  a  procedural criterion the ideal of liberty focuses on the issue of what 
legitimizes a system of rules that is to govern the relations among sovereign individuals. 
Instead of seeking to directly judge the nature or content of that system by applying a pre-
given standard of ‘rights,’ a procedural interpretation of the ideal of liberty views the 
individuals to whom the rules are to be applied as the source from which rules need to derive 
their legitimacy. Such a procedural approach to the ideal of liberty posits that, just as 
voluntary contracting among private law subjects within a framework of rules legitimizes the 
                                                 
17 As Hayek (1973: 82) notes in reference to idea of the evolution of law: “Perhaps one might even say that the 
development of universal rules of conduct … (began) with the first instance of silent barter when a savage placed 
some offerings at the boundary of his tribe in the expectation that a return gift would be made in a similar 
manner, thus beginning a new custom.”  
18 Hayek (1960: 158) acknowledges the absence of an immutable external standard of ‘rights’ when he notes: 
“What exactly is to be included in that bundle of rights that we call ‘property,’ especially where land is 
concerned, … what contracts the state is to enforce, are all issues in which only experience will show what is the 
most expedient arrangement.”    9
social arrangements individuals enter into, so voluntary agreement among sovereign 
individuals legitimizes the rules to which they jointly submit. By contrast to the ideal of 
private autonomy within pre-defined rules, this ideal of individual liberty is about individual 
sovereignty in defining the rules under which a group of persons chooses to live, rules that 
among free and equal individuals can only be chosen by voluntary agreement. 
  The concept of individual sovereignty in constitutional choice raises the question of 
how liberty, and thereby voluntary agreement, can be understood at the constitutional level, 
i.e. at the level where a group of persons collectively decides on the rules they are to submit 
to. As indicated before, this question does not pose any difficulty as long as constitutional 
contracts are concluded within a pre-existing private law system that protects individual 
rights. Individual liberty and voluntariness in contracting are here defined in terms of the 
existing ‘rules of the game.’ This is why a liberal constitutionalism can allow for all kinds of 
constitutional arrangements that are concluded within a private law framework, even if in 
content these arrangements may restrict severely the participants’ freedom of choice. It faces 
difficulties, though, where rule-systems are to be judged for which no more inclusive 
framework of rules exist with reference to which what individual liberty and voluntary 
agreement mean could be specified. This is typically the level of the nation state that defines 
and enforces the rules to which its citizens and those who reside or operate within its 
territorial boundaries are subject.
19 The challenge for liberalism is to specify its ideal of 
individual liberty in a way that is applicable at this level. 
My principal conjecture is that in order to meet this challenge liberal constitutionalism 
needs to be supplemented by a constitutional liberalism that extends the normative principle 
that is implied in the ideal of individual liberty, specified as private autonomy, to the 
constitutional level, i.e. the level where the rules are defined that, in turn, define the content of 
what constitutes private autonomy. The essence of the liberal ideal of private autonomy is the 
notion that voluntary agreement among sovereign individuals should be the principal mode of 
social coordination. It is this very notion that legitimacy in social matters derives from 
voluntary agreement among the participating individuals that must, I submit, be regarded as 
the basic normative principle on which the ideal of liberalism rests. The principle of private 
autonomy specifies this norm with regard to the internal functioning of the private law 
society. In its more general interpretation the notion of the legitimizing role of voluntary 
                                                 
19 Beyond the level of the nation state a constitutional framework exists only insofar as international conventions 
or covenants, such as a charter of universal human rights, are in force and recognized that define individual 
rights in a way that may serve as a reference point for what ‘liberty’ and ‘voluntariness’ requires at the level of 
the nation state. Such supra-national rule-systems would, of course, themselves be subject to the question of 
where they derive their legitimacy from.   10
agreement can, however, also provide a criterion for evaluating the legitimacy of the rules of 
private law that constitute private autonomy. Looked at in this way the ideal of private 
autonomy is simply a specification of the more general normative principle of individual 
sovereignty, the principle that legitimacy in social matters, including the legitimacy of the 
rules of private law themselves, derives only and exclusively from voluntary agreement 
among the persons involved. 
A liberalism that consistently adheres to the principle of individual sovereignty must 
regard as “legitimate” at the political-constitutional level no less than at the sub-constitutional 
level of market choices whatever the individuals involved voluntarily agree upon. To be sure, 
the test of “voluntariness” cannot be quite the same at both levels, at the level of private 
autonomy and at the level of constitutional choice. In the realm of private autonomy the rules 
of law imply a definition of what counts as “voluntary,” a definition that can be adjudicated. 
At the constitutional level the relevant meaning of “voluntary contracting” is clearly more 
difficult to specify. This does not alter the fact, however, that a consistent liberalism must 
consider voluntary agreement as legitimizing principle at the level of constitutional choice – 
whether this “choice” is the product of a spontaneous process or of deliberate, legislative 
procedure – no less than at the level of private autonomy. The challenge to a consistent 
liberalism is to give an answer to the question of how – in recognition of the difficulties that 
are unavoidably inherent in the nature of collective, political choice – individual sovereignty 
and voluntariness in contracting can be defined in the most meaningful way, and be secured 
most effectively, at this level. The way to meet this challenge is to develop a liberal concept 
of democracy that starts from the recognition that the fundamental ideal of liberalism and the 
basic ideal of democracy are not in conflict but in harmony with each other. 
 
4. Democracy and Citizen Sovereignty 
While the deficiencies of modern democratic politics have often been criticized from within 
the liberal paradigm, the liberal research agenda has, unfortunately, remained comparatively 
silent in regard to the positive question of how the political process might be organized so as 
to implement the principle of individual sovereignty at the constitutional level, accounting for 
the specific constraints that are inherent in the nature of politics. In a world in which the 
utopia of a private law society without the state cannot be realized this issue must however be 
addressed by a liberalism that wants to offer a consistent outlook at both, the private realm 
and the public, political realm of human social life.   11
  The common practice of identifying democracy with majority rule distracts from the 
fact that we must distinguish between the basic ideal of democracy and the particular 
institutional forms in which it is practiced. It is in reference to the basic ideal of democracy 
when John Rawls (1971: 84) speaks of a democratic society as “a cooperative venture for 
mutual advantage” and when he describes “democratic citizenship” as “a relation of free and 
equal citizens who exercise ultimate political power as a collective body” (Rawls 1999: 577). 
In this understanding a democratic polity is a citizen cooperative, an association that free and 
equal individuals form to undertake joint projects that they expect to serve their common 
interests. And the freedom of choice that individuals jointly exercise in organizing a citizen 
cooperative I propose to call, as counterpart to the concept of private autonomy, citizen 
sovereignty (Vanberg 2007a). 
  There is an obvious symmetry between the ideal of democracy as citizen cooperative 
and a constitutional liberalism that focuses on the liberty of sovereign individuals as private 
law subjects to agree on constitutional contracts that limit their post-constitutional freedom of 
choice. Both are based on the normative premise that individuals arrange their social relations 
as equals through voluntary contract and that their contractual agreement is the only source 
from which legitimacy in social matters can be derived. In other words, both adopt a 
contractarian-constitutionalist outlook at human cooperative arrangements.
20 
  The concept of democracy as cooperative venture for mutual advantage suggests that, 
notwithstanding the obvious differences that exist between the two kinds of cooperative 
organizations, democratic polities can be compared to cooperative arrangements that 
                                                 
20 Because the contractarian-constitutionalist outlook at politics is often associated with the notion of an original 
contract behind a veil of ignorance or uncertainty a qualifying comment may be in place here. Though this 
conceptual construct may be useful for some purposes, it can easily be misleading because it tends to focus 
unduly on the legitimizing role of original agreement while distracting from the normative significance of 
ongoing agreement (Vanberg 2003). The relevance of this distinction can be shown by comparing democratic 
polities and private voluntary associations. The latter can typically look back on a recorded history that can be 
traced to their very origin in a voluntary contract signed by their founding members. Yet, whether or not this is 
the case, is entirely irrelevant in judging the legitimacy of an association’s current operation. What is of 
relevance for the legitimacy of its internal operation (the issue of the legitimacy of its external operation is to be 
judged in terms of the more inclusive institutional environment) is the voluntary acceptance of the association’s 
constitution by its current members. To the extent that its current members have joined an association voluntarily 
and keep up their membership by voluntary choice it can justly be considered legitimized as a cooperative 
enterprise to the mutual benefit of its members. And it is the task of the legal order within which they are 
embedded to insure that the conditions for voluntariness of membership in private associations are indeed met. 
  The history of democratic polities can typically not meaningfully traced to some original social contract, 
yet, whether or not this is the case is of no immediate relevance for their current legitimacy. It is the ongoing 
voluntary agreement of its members-citizens that provides legitimacy to the constitution of a democratic polity, 
not some original agreement. A constitutional arrangement may have enjoyed voluntary agreement at its origin, 
but if it is no longer accepted by the citizens in its current effective form it can surely not be considered more 
legitimate than a constitutional arrangement that may have been imposed originally by outside force or by 
internal decree, but that in its current operation is met by general approval within the respective constituency. 
The essential burden of providing legitimacy to the operation of democratic polities lies with the ongoing 
voluntary agreement of their members-citizens to the respective constitutional framework.   12
autonomous private law subjects voluntarily form for their mutual advantage.
21 Like the 
members of a private voluntary association the citizens of a democratic polity are the ultimate 
sovereigns in whose common interest the cooperative venture is supposed to work. And just 
as the members of a private cooperative venture face the problem of organizing their 
enterprise in ways that enhance the prospects for mutual advantage and limit the risk of 
measures being taken that are to their disadvantage, the citizens of a democratic polity face 
the problem of agreeing on a constitution that promotes the prospects for realizing mutual 
gains and reduces the risk of adverse policy measures. What, in particular, distinguishes the 
two cases is, as noted above, that private cooperative arrangements are formed under the 
umbrella of a private law system, enforced by the state, while democratic polities have to 
solve the problem of constitutional agreement in the absence of a comparable framework of 
rules that define and protect the rights of the participating individuals. 
  If democratic polities are to function as ‘cooperative ventures for mutual advantage’ 
they must be organized in ways that best insure responsiveness to their citizens’ common 
interests or, in other words, they must provide for citizen sovereignty. Actual and potential 
alternative institutional provisions can be compared in terms of their capacity to serve this 
purpose. Identifying the specific set of institutions that are best suited to assure 
responsiveness to citizens’ common interests or citizen sovereignty is the principal task of 
democratic constitutionalism.  
  The need to distinguish between the “true content of the democratic ideal” (Hayek 
1979: 5) and “the particular institutions which have long been accepted as its embodiment” 
(ibid.: 1f) has been strongly emphasized by Hayek who takes care to make clear that his 
critique of the now prevailing form of democratic organization is not meant as a critique of 
the “basic principle of democracy” (ibid.: 4) but as a critique of what he considers a defective 
implementation of this principle. The target of his critique is not the basic democratic 
principle that all legitimate political power originates from ‘the people’ (Hayek 2001: 84), i.e. 
from the individual members-citizens of the polity, but an institutional form that he 
characterizes as unlimited democracy, as unrestricted majority rule.
22 What he advocates is a 
constitutionally limited democracy, majority rule subject to constitutional constraints.
23 
                                                 
21 It is in this sense that Buchanan (1999b: 61) suggests a politics-as-exchange paradigm that looks at politics as 
“a structure of complex exchange among individuals.” As Buchanan (ibid.) notes: “Without some model of 
exchange, no coercion of the individual by the state is consistent with the individualistic value norm on which a 
liberal order is grounded.” 
22 The view of that “popular sovereignty … means … that majority rule is unlimited and unlimitable” Hayek 
(1960: 106) criticizes as the “conception of the doctrinaire democrat.” 
23 Hayek (1960: 180): “A constitutional system … means a limitation of the means available to a temporary 
majority for the achievement of particular objectives by general principles laid down by another majority for a   13
  In their classic contribution to a constitutional liberalism, The Calculus of Consent, 
James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962) have specified the prudential reasons why 
sovereign individuals in forming a polity – or, for that matter, any association for collective 
action – can be expected to adopt majority rule in deciding their ongoing common affairs. 
Hayek’s emphasis is on the fact that sovereign individuals are well advised to make such 
agreement contingent on majority rule being restricted by general principles. While insisting 
that liberalism is “incompatible with unlimited democracy” and “presupposes the limitation of 
powers … of the majority by requiring a commitment to principles” (Hayek 1978b: 143), 
Hayek stresses that such limitation of majority rule is “not by another superior ‘will’ but by 
the consent of the people on which all power and the coherence of the state rest” (1979: 3). 
Constitutionalism, i.e. the principle “that all power rests on the understanding that it will be 
exercised according to commonly accepted principles” (Hayek 1960: 181), is in Hayek’s 
account in no way in conflict with the basic ideal of democracy but is a protective device that 
sovereign individuals have good reasons to adopt in organizing their political affairs. As he 
puts it: “Only a demagogue can represent as ‘antidemocratic’ the limitations which long-term 
decisions and the general principles held by the people impose upon the power of the 
temporary majorities. These limitations are conceived to protect the people against those to 
whom they must give power, and they are the only means by which the people can determine 
the general character of the order under which they will live” (ibid.).
24 
 A  constitutional liberalism, a liberalism that views individual persons not only as 
sovereigns within the legal framework of the private law society, but no less so as sovereigns 
at the antecedent, constitutional level can, as Hayek’s arguments testify, be reconciled with an 
ideal of democracy that insists on the sovereignty of the members-citizens of a polity to 
jointly define the terms of their cooperative venture.
25 Just as voluntary agreement legitimizes 
                                                                                                                                                         
long period in advance.” – On the logic of constitutional constraints Hayek (ibid.: 179) comments: “The 
fundamental distinction between a constitution and ordinary laws is similar to that between laws in general and 
their application by the courts to a particular case: as in deciding concrete cases the judge is bound by general 
rules, so the legislature in making particular laws is bound by the more general principles of the constitution. The 
justification for these distinctions is also similar in both cases: as a judicial decision is regarded as just only if it 
is in conformity with a general law, so particular laws are regarded as just only if they conform to more general 
principles. And as we want to prevent the judge from infringing the law for some particular reason, so we also 
want to prevent the legislature from infringing certain general principles for the sake of temporary and 
immediate aims.” 
24 Hayek (1960: 182): “A commitment to long-term principles, in fact, gives the people more control over the 
general nature of the political order.” 
25 Mises (1949: 271) points to the symmetry between the issue of “the sovereignty of the individual” in the 
market and in the political arena when he notes: “It would be more correct to say that a democratic constitution 
is a scheme to assign to the citizen in the conduct of government the same supremacy the market economy gives 
them in their capacity as consumers.” – As Mises (ibid.) adds: “However, the comparison is imperfect. In the 
political democracy only the votes cast for the majority candidate or for the majority plan are effective in 
shaping the course of affairs. … But on the market no vote is cast in vain.”   14
social transactions and corporate arrangements within the private law society, voluntary 
agreement among the parties involved must be considered the ultimate source of legitimacy of 
the legal-institutional framework within which individuals exercise their private autonomy. In 
this sense Hayek’s (1960: 106) statement can be read that “it is the acceptance of such 
common principles that makes a collection of people a community. And this common 
acceptance is the indispensable condition for a free society.” 
 
5.  The Protective State and the Productive State 
The liberal ideal of individual liberty as private autonomy can be given substantive content 
only in the context of a framework of rules that define mutually compatible individual rights. 
The discussion so far has been mainly concerned with the fact that, where the framework of 
rules that constitute private autonomy is not self-evident and not self-enforcing, the private 
law society needs an agency, the state that codifies and enforces the rules.
26 It has been 
concerned with the implications of this fact for a liberalism that extends its basic normative 
principle, the principle of individual sovereignty, to the constitutional level. And it has 
pointed out the symmetry that exists between a constitutional liberalism that accounts for 
individual sovereignty in constitutional choice and the basic ideal of democracy as a 
cooperative venture of free and equal individuals for mutual advantage. 
  What individual liberty as private autonomy entails is, however, not only defined by 
what the private law system defines as individual rights. It is also limited by the extent of the 
‘assured private space,’ i.e. by how the demarcation line between private law society and the 
state is drawn. The organization ‘state’ that the private law society needs to set up in order to 
enforce its ‘rules of the game’ can, once it exists, also be employed to carry out other projects 
that its members-citizens may consider of mutual advantage. Or, stated differently, the 
democratic polity as a citizen cooperative may advance the common interests of its members 
not only by the services it provides as enforcer and legislator of the rules of the private law 
society but also by providing other services of mutual interest. Buchanan (1975: 68f.) has 
coined the terms protective state and productive state to describe the difference between the 
two types of governmental functions. Hayek (1973: 48) speaks of “the distinction between the 
                                                 
26 As M. Friedman (1962: 25) has put it, in order to peacefully live together in a free society we need a 
government as “a means whereby we can modify the rules, to mediate differences among us on the meaning of 
the rules, and to enforce compliance with the rules.”   15
coercive function in which government enforces the rules of conduct, and its service function 
in which it need merely administer resources placed at its disposal.”
27  
  Recognizing the dual role of government as enforcing agent and as service agency 
raises the issue of what the ideal of liberalism implies for the permissible extent of the 
‘productive state.’ Hayek expressly distances his own view from ‘minimal state’ conceptions 
that consider only legitimate the state’s role as enforcer of the private law system. Such 
conceptions, so he argues, “have nothing to do with the aim of securing individual liberty to 
all” (1979: 41), and he notes: “Far from advocating such a ‘minimal state’, we find it 
unquestionable that in an advanced society government ought to use its power of raising funds 
by taxation to provide a number of services which for various reasons cannot be provided, or 
cannot be provided adequately, by the market” (ibid.). The extent to which the members of a 
citizen cooperative decide to extend the state’s service functions is not an issue that can be 
decided a priori on liberal principles but is a matter of expediency that sovereign individuals 
have to decide among themselves in light of the expected benefits and the risks involved in 
extending the powers of government.
28 Liberal reasoning on the virtues of private enterprise 
and market competition can provide important arguments for citizens to consider in deciding 
on this matter, but they cannot deprive citizens from their sovereignty in choosing the 
arrangements under which they wish to live. While acknowledging that the principle of 
laissez faire rightly “expressed protest against abuses of governmental power,” Hayek (1973: 
62) points out that it “never provided a criterion by which one could decide what were the 
proper functions of government.”
29 The liberal ideal of individual sovereignty can only 
provide a procedural criterion that indirectly judges the legitimacy of governmental 
arrangements by looking at the nature of the decision making process from which they result. 
  The distinction between the protective and the service function of government is 
related to, if not identical with, another distinction between two roles of government, namely 
the distinction between the state as the agency that defines and enforces the rules to which 
everybody within its territorial limits is subject, and the state as the cooperative enterprise that 
provides particular services to its members. In the first role the state can be characterized as 
                                                 
27 See also Hayek’s (1960: 222) comments on the “distinction between the coercive measures of government and 
those pure service activities where coercion does not enter or does so only because of the need of financing them 
by taxation.” 
28 As Hayek (1979: 45) explains, citizens’ choice to allow government to take on such service functions can be 
looked at “as a sort of exchange: each agreeing to contribute to a common pool according to some uniform 
principles. … So long as each may expect to get from this common pool services which are worth more to him 
than what he is made to contribute, it will be in his interest to submit to coercion.”  - The notion that politics in a 
free society may be conceptualized as exchange is central to Buchanan’s contractarian constitutionalist approach 
(see fn. 20 above). 
29 Hayek (1973: 62) adds: “Much the same applies to the terms ‘free enterprise’ or ‘market economy’ which, 
without a definition of the free sphere of the individual, say little.”    16
territorial enterprise, in the second as community enterprise of its citizens. In both roles the 
democratic state acts as the agent of its citizens and its activities have to be legitimized in 
terms of the common interests of its members-citizens. Yet there is a critical difference 
between the two. In its first capacity the state codifies and enforces the rules of the private law 
society and its twin, the market economy, rules that apply equally to its citizens as private law 
subjects as well as to non-citizens who, as private law subjects, reside or operate within the 
state’s jurisdiction. By contrast, in its second role the state legislates and enforces the rules 
that constitute the polity as a corporate organization, rules that define the terms of 
membership in the polity and that, accordingly, apply to individuals only in their capacity as 
members of the polity. The noted difference is of importance because the rights and 
obligations that exist between individuals as private law subjects, i.e. as members of the 
private law society, and the rights and obligations that define their status as members of the 
polity are categorically different. And it is, as I suppose, the failure adequately to keep the two 
functions apart that is behind many of the problems of the modern democratic welfare state 
that have been the particular target of liberal criticism. 
  The rules that constitute the private law society and the market economy define an 
open arena for voluntary cooperation between individuals who are obliged to respect the 
general ‘rules of the game’ but, otherwise, have no obligations to each other except for those 
that they voluntarily enter into by mutual contract. In terms of Hayek’s (1973: 35ff.) 
distinction between ‘two kinds of order’: the private law society is a spontaneous order, not 
an organization in which individuals cooperate as a team in order to produce ‘collective 
goods.’ Within the private law society autonomous private law subjects can create 
organizations by voluntary contract, but the private law society itself is not a joint enterprise 
to which its members owe certain contributions and from which they receive benefits in 
return. It is an ‘open society’ in which everybody can participate who respects its rules, not a 
‘club’ with membership dues and membership rights. By contrast, the state as community 
enterprise is an organization, an organization that, notwithstanding its specific nature, can 
indeed be compared to a club whose members, the citizens, are obliged to pay their 
membership dues and are entitled to club-services, as these obligations and entitlements are 
defined by the constituting rules of the organization.  
  The distinction between the state as territorial enterprise that provides the institutional 
framework for the private law society and the state as community enterprise of its citizens is 
of particular significance in regard to the role of ‘social legislation,’ i.e. in regard to the ways 
in which the state can provide a ‘social safety net’ for its citizens. Hayek has addressed the   17
issue that is at stake here in his discussion on minimum income provisions. His principal 
argument is clearly stated in a paragraph that is worth quoting at length: 
  “There is no reason why in a free society government should not assure to all 
  protection against severe deprivation in the form of an assured minimum income, or a 
  floor below which nobody need to descend. To enter into such an insurance against 
  extreme misfortune may well be in the interest of all; or it may be felt as a clear moral 
  duty of all to assist, within the organized community, those who cannot help 
  themselves. So long as such a uniform minimum income is provided outside the 
  market to all those who, for any reason, are unable to earn in the market an adequate 
  maintenance, this need not lead to a restriction of freedom, or a conflict with the Rule 
  of Law” (Hayek 1976: 87). 
 
By speaking of “the organized community” as the provider of minimum income insurance, 
and by noting that, as long as such insurance is provided “outside the market,” a “conflict 
with the Rule of Law” does not arise, Hayek implicitly draws the same distinction between 
the two state functions as that discussed above.
30 As members of “the organized community” 
citizens can, through the political process, enter into all kinds of commitments, including 
commitments to assure each other a minimum income in case of need. In deciding on its size 
and the terms under which it is provided they will have to consider, as a matter of prudence, 
the incentive effects of such schemes, the risks of abuse, and other problems that they may 
involve. There is no objection, though, that could, in principle, be raised where such insurance 
arrangements are chosen by citizens who exercise their sovereignty in defining the terms 
under which they wish to live together. A minimum income insurance provided by the state as 
community enterprise, and financed by the contributions citizens are willing to make for this 
purpose, is, however, entirely different from the state intervening in the market by ‘social 
legislation’ that is in conflict with the nature of the market as the “game of catallaxy” (Hayek 
1976: 115ff.). Such ‘social legislation’ obfuscates – and this is Hayek’s essential point – the 
categorical difference between the private law society and the polity as a corporate 
organization, and the categorical difference between the universal rules of conduct that define 
the arena within which autonomous private law subjects meet, and the rules of organization 
that define the rights and obligations of citizens as members of a the state as community 
enterprise. This is meant when Hayek (1973: 141) speaks of the “transformation of private 
law into public law by ‘social legislation’.” 
                                                 
30 The proviso “outside the market” is expressly emphasized by Hayek at several places where he addresses the 
issue of a minimum income insurance. See e.g. Hayek (1967a: 175): “There is of course no reason why a society 
which, thanks to the market, is as rich as modern society should not provide outside the market a minimum 
security for all who in the market fall below a certain standard. Our point was merely that considerations of 
justice provide no justification for ‘correcting’ the results of the market and that justice, in the sense of treatment 
under the same rules, requires that each takes what a market provides in which every participant behaves fairly” 
(emphasis in the original). See also Hayek (1979: 142).   18
  The fact that, in his view, it tended to erode the critical distinction between the 
function of the state as community enterprise of its citizens and its role as guardian of the 
private law society was the essential reason for Hayek’s (1967b: 244) reservations about the 
German concept of the ‘Soziale Marktwirtschaft’ (social market economy). And, just as the 
development that the ‘German model’ has taken over the decades of its existence testifies 
indeed to the justification of Hayek’s concerns, the failure to adequately separate between the 
two functions of the state must, in general, be counted among the root causes of many of the 
problems of the modern welfare state. 
 
6. Individual Liberty and Citizen Sovereignty in the European Union 
In both its functions, as territorial enterprise that, within its territorial boundaries, defines and 
enforces the rules to which individuals – citizens as well as non-citizens – are subject in their 
private activities and as a community enterprise, the democratic state is an agency that is 
supposed to serve the common interests of its principals, the members of the polity. In the 
discussion so far the ‘polity’ has implicitly been identified with the nation state. Yet, 
individuals are organized, of course, in political units at various levels and with different 
territorial extensions such as local communities, states or provinces, nation states, and supra-
national units such as the European Union. Such multi-level political organization can account 
for the fact that the interests that people have in common may very well vary across territorial 
units, both with regard to the general rules of conduct to which they are willing to submit as 
well as with regard to the services that they wish to see provided by their respective 
community enterprise. The ideal that democratic polities function as cooperative ventures for 
mutual advantage requires that the exercise of political authority with regard to both 
governmental functions matches the geography of citizens’ common interests.  
  In this concluding section I want to take a brief look at the role the European Union 
can play as a supranational political unit in regard to the two noted governmental functions, as 
a territorial enterprise that legislates and enforces rules that define and protect the rights of 
individuals as private law subjects within its inclusive jurisdiction, and as a community 
enterprise that provides services funded from a common pool which the citizens of the 
member states have to finance by their contributions. 
  The most important, and unambiguously positive contribution that the process of 
European integration has made to advance individual liberty and citizen sovereignty is in 
creating a common market with its ‘four freedoms,’ the freedom of movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital. This has significantly enlarged the liberty of individuals as   19
private law subjects to engage in voluntary trade and cooperation with other private law 
subjects across the European Union, uninhibited by the obstacles that national boundaries 
between the member states would otherwise tend to present. And, by facilitating the exit-
option, it has increased inter-jurisdictional competition between the member states, making 
governments more responsive to the interests of their citizens and to the interests of those 
whose business they wish to attract to their jurisdiction. 
  Considering the heterogeneity of interests that must be presumed to exist between the 
different people across the various member states, the prospects for the EU to serve, as 
community enterprise, common interests of all European citizens are surely much more 
limited. Whatever genuinely common interests one may be able to identify that citizens across 
all member states share with regard to community services they are willing to finance from a 
common pool, interests in redistributive arrangements are particularly unlikely candidates. In 
an article on “The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism,” originally published in 
1939, Hayek (1948) predicted that, because the feelings of solidarity and “the sympathies with 
the neighbor” (ibid.: 263) as well as the “homogeneity and the similarity in outlook and 
tradition” (ibid.: 264) that may facilitate agreement on redistributive social insurance 
arrangements within nation states are absent in a federation “composed of people of different 
nationalities and different traditions” (ibid.), the scope for such policies would be much 
narrower for the central government than for national government, and he expected the danger 
of such policies to become the playing field of special-interest lobbying and rent-seeking to be 
much more limited in a federation than in a nation state. 
The role that redistributive policies have come to occupy in the European Union indicates that 
Hayek’s expectations about the functioning of interstate federalism may have been 
overoptimistic.
31 In fact, it is in this regard that European integration started with a ‘birth 
defect’ by including the redistributive common agricultural policy in its founding document, 
the Treaty of Rome. This provided the model that allowed further redistributive elements – 
such as structural funds, cohesion funds or the social charter – to be included into the Union’s 
policy agenda. It is these areas of EU policies for which it is most doubtful whether they can 
be legitimized in terms of genuine common interests that citizens across the various member 
states share. If the EU is to function as a guardian of individual liberty and citizen sovereignty 
it is clearly its role as territorial enterprise that ought to be strengthened while its authority as 
community enterprise ought to be strictly limited. 
                                                 
31 M. Wohlgemuth (2008) critically discusses Hayek’s argument in the context of a review of “50 Years of 
European ‘Ordnungspolitik’.”     20
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